[Olsr-dev] olsrd dynamic hna

Jonathan P. Chapman (spam-protected)
Sun Jun 27 16:19:31 CEST 2010

 Am 27.06.2010 13:53, schrieb Gioacchino Mazzurco:
> yes but i think that 99,99999999999999% of dynamic hna, user will use
> 0::1 ( localhost ) as permitted address then an attacker can't do
> nothing ;)
Well, that would depend on whether the host drops packet with a
localhost IP-sender if they come from a non-loopback interface. I  would
figure that it would make sense to behave that way, but neither am I
sure that many (all) OSs behave that way nor can you enforce this
through olsrd, so it causes me a headache to consider that a security
mechanism ;-)
But you will know best what effort makes sense in your use case(s), just
make sure that you document the mechanism well in case you publish the
code, so others can assess whether the same is true for them :-)

Best regards!


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