[Olsr-dev] olsrd web of trust plug-in

(spam-protected) (spam-protected)
Mon Dec 22 18:04:07 CET 2008

On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 2:24 PM, Henning Rogge <(spam-protected)> wrote:
> On Montag 22 Dezember 2008 14:11:58 you wrote:
>> On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 1:25 PM, Henning Rogge <(spam-protected)>
> wrote:
> "Insiders" are attackers who own at least one legal node of your network, so
> they own the key material of this node too.
> If you just do "link based" security (you authentificate that the packages you
> receive are send by the one-hop neighbor it pretends to be) an attacker can
> just use his legal key to "retransmit" a forged packet. The attacker will just
> pretend that he got a package from someone else and you have no chance to
> validate it's claim.

Yes, that's right. But otherwise each node should store all the public
keys of the other nodes in the network (or download a key each time it
needs it), and, unless we use synchronized time (argh), to prevent
replay attacks, perform a timestamp exchange with every other node in
the network...

But if we put ourselves in a community network scenario, we can just
focus on outsider attacks and assume that the neighboring nodes that
we know and trust will not act maliciously against us.
(In fact the title of my thesis, "Trusted routing in OLSR MANETs" is
wrong. It should have been something like "Trusted routing in Wireless
Community Networks", but thanks to italian bureocracy the title
couldn't be changed... :/ )


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