[olsr-dev] Implementing an attack into olsrd
Sven-Ola Tuecke
(spam-protected)
Mon Jun 19 10:42:23 CEST 2006
Hi,
using Pub/Priv keypairs is not really an option:
- U need the openssl/matrixssl lib installed (>1Mb footprint)
- Much cpu overhead to calculate keys each time you receive
a message (no hardware enc in the WRT), this will kill any
embedded box > 2 neighbours.
- Need to fiddle with all neighbours to fetch their pubkeys ->
mesh network is not open any more / very hard to handle
the org. Need to setup an Key-Expire-Infrastructure too.
I think it is more effective, to spot the location of a new
vandal and make a personal visit with a couple of mesh
members. In most cases this will be more easy than on the
internet - Wifi range isn't too large...
Sven-Ola
"Aaron Kaplan" <(spam-protected)> schrieb im Newsbeitrag
news:(spam-protected)
> >
>> Afaik this is simply a shared key, which is not very secure in a
>> community
>> network with several nodes and several different admins (in most cases
>> at
>> least > 50).
>>
> Yes that is how i remember the secure plugin.
> I don't know if we really want a signature checking (RSA, public key
> crypto etc)
> in small embedded devices but anyway - for a centralized approach -
> signing the olsr packets with a cert (packet originator) which is signed
> by the master cert - is more what I was thinking about.
>
> There are distributed approaches as well. I can find out references to
> papers if needed.
>
>
>
>
>> though the threshold might be higher
>>
>> Jens
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