On Thu, 2007-03-01 at 09:56 +0900, giuseppe de marco wrote:
> Bernd Petrovitsch wrote:
> > On Wed, 2007-02-28 at 17:11 +0900, giuseppe de marco wrote:
> > [...]
> >   
> >> It makes sense or I am loosing something?
> >>     
> >
> > Apart from layer 1 and layer 2 attacks (see Sven-Olas mail), one can
> > simply announce wrong routes (via HNA, just configure it on your
> > interface, etc.).
> > And all routing protocols AFAIK may suffer from routers advertising
> > illegal/wrong routes. Usually this is not a serious problem because
> > - on border routers (with BGPv4) one blocks neighbors advertising wrong
> > routes.
> > - within an AS, you have *one* organization (with interest in a working
> > network)
> >    and if they do not manage to get the routers working securily they
> > (both the
> >    admins and their bosses) are screwed anyway.
[...]
> What do you mean with "wrong" routes? If you mean route towards nothing, 

Routes that are actually not true - either of unused IP adresses/nets or
of used IP-adresses/nets in other parts of the network.

> I agree: the routers in the net does the job.

And every OLSR node is a router.

> Actually, I am talking about good route, in the sense they are valid as 

You started the first mail with
----  snip  ----
Suppose I am a malicious node.
----  snip  ----
So I assumed that you want to distub the rest of the network. And htat s
much easier with other means (though very probably not so subtle as with
"miscalculated" LQ values).

> sequence of links towards a destination, but
> the LQ of the link is not calculate properly.

	Bernd
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